Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities by Simonton, James W.
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 4 
November 1917 
Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities 
James W. Simonton 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James W. Simonton, Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 W. Va. L. Rev. (1917). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIGINIA -LAW QUARTERLY
OIL AND GAS LEASES AND THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
By JAMZES W. SIMONTON'
T HE validity of a certain type of oil and gas lease has recently
been questioned on the ground that it violates the rule against
perpetuities.2 Under the existing law in many of the states which
are large producers of these minerals, it seems that there is
merit in such an objection. The point raised is sufficiently inter-
esting and important to justify a brief discussion of the applica-
tion of the rule against perpetuities to oil and gas leases, in view
of the fact that there are a large number of leases in force to which
the objection, stated above, may be made, and that such forms are
still being used by many oil and gas companies.
The rule against perpetuities is stated by Professor Gray as
follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest."' If by any possibility an interest might vest beyond
the prescribed limit of time, such interest is void. The rule against
perpetuities has to do with property interests only, and does not
apply, to mere contract rights.' A future interest which is not
limited on a life or lives in being at its creation, must vest, if at
all, within a gross term of twenty-one years.r, Within the latter
limit of time future interests, arising under oil and gas leases,
must vest, since such leases are seldom, if ever, made for the term
of any life or lives in being."
The forms of oil and gas leases to which the objection can be
reasonably made that they may possibly give rise to future inter-
ests which may vest more than twenty-one years after the execution
of said leases, are: (1) leases for no definite term, which, by their
provisions, give the lessee the option to drill a well or pay a cer-
tain sum periodically as delay rental in lieu of drilling, until a
1 Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 88 N. E. 1075 (W. Va. 1916).
s GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3 ed., § 201.
'GnAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3 "ed., § 329.
vGRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIESU, 3 ed., §§ 223, 224.
See Wagner D. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584 (lease for 40 years).
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well is completed; (2) leases for a fixed term of more than twenty-
one years with no power in the lessor to terminate during such
fixed period. Either form, of course, may have the usual pro-
vision that upon discovery of oil or gas the lease is to continue as
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced, a clause of such char-
acter being immaterial so far as the rule against perpetuities is
concerned.
Leases of the first type, which apparently may be continued in-
definitely at the option of the lessee, are frequently called "no-
term" leases. They are well known in the oil and gas producing
sections of the country. There are few, if any, oil and gas leases
of the second type but if any such be found they will be just as
objectionable to the rule against perpetuities as leases for an in-
definite term.
It is now settled by the great weight of authority that the owner
of land does not have title to the oil or gas that may be beneath
the surface of his land, and that he can acquire title to such oil
and gas only by severing them from the land or reducing them to
his possession.7  It has been decided that the property in the oil
and gas in the pools beneath the land is not in any individual
owner of the overlying soil, but is in all the owners of the soil
above said pools in common." While the individual landowner
has no title to the oil and gas in place, he does have the exclusive
right to sink wells on his land, tap the pool beneath and take as
much of the oil and gas therefrom as he can secure, even though he
exhausts the supply so that the surrounding land is completely
drained of the minerals;9 though probably a deliberate waste of
the minerals may be enjoined. 0 This right to take oil and gas
7 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190; Osborn v. Arkansas Oil Co., 103 Ark.
175, 146 S. W. 122; Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 I1. 9, 84 N. E. 53;
Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N. E. 525; Louisville
Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368; Wagner -V. Mallory,
169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584; Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902;
Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 Atl. 911; Westmoreland, -etc., Natural Gas Co.
v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 233, 18 AtI. 724. See also an excellent article by Mr. John
Stokes Adams on The Right of a Landowner to Oil and Gas In his Land, in 63 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 471.
SKansas Natural Gas Co. %,. Haskell, 172 Fed. 545 (C. C. Okla.); Lindlay
v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (D. C. Ky.); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190;
Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490.
Kelly, v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 0. St. 317, 49 N. E. 399; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa.
St. 324, 27 AtI. 714; Jones v. Forest City Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 379, 44 AtI. 1074;
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. St. 362, 65 AtI. 801.
1OLouisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368; Hague
v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. St. 324, 27 At. 714.
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found beneath the surface of the land is therefore an incorporeal
property right. As was recently said:
"This right [of the landowner to the oil and gas in place]
may be resolved into two successive rights: i. e., to explore
therefor by drilling wells, and then, if discovered, to produce
them [oil and gas]. Having such right, he can transfer it,
and immediately upon the execution of the transfer an estate
in the land vests in the person to whom it is made, at least so
far as the right to explore is concerned." 11
Certainly the landowner may convey to a third party either the
whole of his right or a limited interest therein, though he cannot
transfer any title to the oil and gas in place, because he can trans-
fer no more than he has. A transferee of such an interest acquires
a right to enter on the land and search for oil and gas and take
the minerals if he finds them. Such briefly is the nature of the
landowner's property interest in oil and gas beneath his land in
most of the states where the question has been decided.' 2 In West
Virginia and Kansas oil and gas in place is held to belong to the
landowner just as a vein of coal belongs to him, and he may sever
by conveyance the ownership of the oil and gas from that of the
surface, just as he can sever the ownership of a vein of coal from
that of the rest of the land.' s
Oil and gas are usually mined under leases by which the land-
owner grants for a limited time the privilege of exercising his
right to take oil and gas which may be found beneath the surface.
The lessor usually secures a share in the profits, if oil or gas is
discovered, by reserving a royalty on the mineral produced. The
development of the land for oil and gas so that the lessor can
secure royalties is quite generally regarded as the chief consid-
u Lindlay 'v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928, 933 (D. C., Ky.).
1 It is believed that statements sometimes found to the effect that a landowner
bas title to the oil and gas beneath his land but loses such title when said minerals
escape across 'his boundary do not represent the law in any state. The idea comes
from the analogy to animals ferae naturae drawn by Justice Mitchell in Westmore-
land Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 18 Atl. 724. As pointed out by
the Supreme Court of Indiana in State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. B. 809,
the public has a paramount right in animals ferae naturae, but the public has no
such right in oil and gas in place. Hence the analogy to wild animals tends to
confusion.
1sMoore v. Griffin, 72 Nan. 164, 83 Pac. 395; Mound City Brick & Gas Co. V. Good-
speed Gas & Oil Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109 Pac. 1002; Williamson vV. Jones, 39 W. Va.
231, 19 S. E. 436; Wilson u. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781; Preston 'V. White,
57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236. See also Texas Co, v. Daugherty, 176 S. W. 717
(Tex.) ; Pierce Fordyce Oil Ass'n. v. Woodrum, 188 S. W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App.).
3
Simonton: Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1917
OIL AND GAS LEASES AS PERPETUITIES
eration for the lease.14 There is much confusion among the au-
thorities dealing with the rights of a lessee under an oil and gas
lease. This is to be expected when we remember that the courts
are here dealing with peculiar minerals which are vagrant in
character, like percolating waters, yet do not underlie the whole
surface of the earth, but are confined in comparatively localized
pools or reservoirs. The courts of some states have construed oil
and gas leases, where the sole purpose of the demise is the ex-
ploration for, and production of, oil and gas, as giving the lessee
no immediate vested interest in the land, but only a right or
license to enter on the land and search for oil and gas until he
makes an actual discovery. 5  The courts of other states hold
that the lessee under a similar lease gets an immediate vested right
in the lands, but that a new and different estate vests in him upon
the discovery of oil or gas.'8 At all events the lessee gets at least
an exclusive right 7 to explore for oil and gas, together with a
right to take oil and gas from the land, contingent upon discovery
of the same. It might be suggested that if the right of the lessor
consists of a right to explore and a right to take, then the right
to explore passes at once to the lessee, but the right to take is con-
tingent upon actual discovery of oil or gas.
Some courts treat many oil and gas leases as vesting an im-
14 Higgins v. Daley, 99 Fed. 606 (C. C. A., 4th Cir.) ; Brown v. Wilson, 160 Pac.
94 (Okla.) ; Steelsmith v. Gartlin, 45 W. Va. 27, 33, 29 S. E. 978.
Is "The title is inchoate, and for the purpose of exploration only, until oil is
found. If it is not found, no estate vests- in the lessee, and his title, whatever it is,
ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned." Venture Oil Co. V. Fretts, 152
Pa. St. 451, 460, 25 Atl. 732, 735. See also Higgins v,. Daley, 99 Fed. 606 (C. C.
A., 4th Cir.), 48 L. R. A. 320; Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Ranch Oil & De-
velopment Co., 156 Cal. 211, 103 Pac. 927; Rawlings v. Arme], 70 Kan. 778, 79 Pac.
683; Dill v. Fraze, 169 Ind. 53, 79 N. E. 971; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501,
62 N. E. 584; Kelley v. Keys, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 Atl. 911; Richlands Oil Co. a,.
Morriss, 10S Va. 288, 61 S. E. 762; Steelsmith v. Gartlin, supra; State v. South
Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688; Kilcoyne v. Southern Oil Co., 61 W. Va.
538, 56 S. E. 888; The Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836.
Though the courts of West Virginia and Kansas hold that oil and gas in place is
capable of separate ownership apart from the land just like coal (see note 13) yet
these states hold an oil and gas lessee gets no vested interest In the oil and gas
until discovery. In West Virginia if the purpose of a grant of oil and gas is to
explore for and mine them, the instrument seems to be treated as a lease regardless
of the language of the granting clause. See Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167,
58 S. E. 915.
16 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 8th Cir.) ; Watford Oil
Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46;
Heal v. Niagara Oil Co., 150 Ind. 483, 50 N. E. 482.
17Westmoreland, etc., Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130"Pa. St. 235, 18 AtI. 724; Lynch
v. Burford, 201 Pa. St. 52, 50 Atl. 229; THORNTON, THB LAW RELAT3NG TO O;L AND
GAs, 2 ed., § 90.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1917], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss1/4
WBST VI.GINIA LAW QUARTBLY
mediate estate in the land in the lessees, especially if such leases
purport to demise the land for the purpose of searching for and
mining oil and gas.t 8 But in some of these jurisdictions, if the
lease does not purport to grant the land to the lessee, but merely
grants the oil and gas with the right to enter and explore for and
produce them, it is construed, like the leases mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, as giving merely a right to explore for
the mineral until oil or gas. is actually found, so that in such ease
an estate vests when oil or gas is actually discovered. 19
There may be other views differing somewhat from any of the
above, but the idea that some sort of a new and greater estate in
the land vests in the lessee when he actually discovers oil or gas is
becoming rather well established in most of the oil and gas pro-
ducing states. The doctrine is particularly well established in
West Virginia and Pennsylvania, though in the latter state it
does not apply to all leases.2 e It is this new estate which may
possibly vest too remotely under some oil and gas leases.
As a practical illustration, it may be well to note in two forms
of oil and gas leases the express provisions which are construed
as vesting in the lessee an estate in the land when he actually dis-
covers oil or gas. The first excerpt is taken from the lease involved
in the case of Lowther Oil Go. v. Guffey.2'
"In consideration of the sum of one dollar the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, Ella Yoak and Agnew
Yoak, ...... hereby grant unto James M. Guffey,
. . . . second party, their heirs and assigns, all the oil
and gas in and under the following described premises, to-
gether with the right of ingress and egress at all times, for
the purpose of drilling and operating for oil, gas and
water .......
"To have and to hold the above p.emises unto the parties
of the second part, their heirs and assigns, on the following
conditions: ...... .. in ease no well is completed within
two years from this date then this grant shall immediately
become null and void as to both parties, provided that the
19 Coalinga Pacific Oil & Gas Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 16 Cal. App. 361, 116 Pac.
1107; Brown v. Fowler, 65 0. St. 507, 63 N. E. 76; Central Ohio Natural Gas &
Fuel Co. v. Eckert, 80 0. St. 127, 71 N. B. 281; Barnsdall v,. Bradford Gas Co., 225
Pa. St. 338, 74 AtM 207; Williams v. Fowler, 201 Pa. St. 336, 50 kA.tl. 969.
19 Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Ranch oil & Development Co., 156 Cal. 211,
103 Pac. 927; Ramage -. Wilson, 45 Ind. App. 599, 88 N. E. 862; Venture oil Co.
v. Fretts, 152 Pa. St. 451, 25 At. 732; Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 Atl. 911;
Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. St. 128, 89 AtM 823.
20 See cases cited in notes 15 and 19, supra.
- 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. 101.
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second party may -prevent such forfeiture from year to year
by paying to the first party annually in advance eighteen &
75/100 dollars at her residence until such well is com-
pleted. ........
This lease was held valid. The court said it gave to the lessee
an option to continue the lease from year to year by payment
annually of the non-forfeiture sum. There are a considerable
number of decisions in accord.22
Sometimes provisions similar to the following are found:
"Agreement, made and entered into the ............................
by and between ............................... party of the first part, and
.................................... party of the second part.
"Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part, for and
in consideration of the sum of one dollar . . . . and of
the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained on the
part of the party of the second part, ..... .. has granted,
demised, leased and let and by these presents does grant,
demise, lease and let unto the said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns, for the sole and only purpose of min-
ing and operating for oil and gas,. ....
"It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for, the
term of ten years from this date and so long thereafter as the
said land is operated by the lessee in the search for or pro-
duction of oil or gas, with the extension of term by payment
of rentals as hereinafter set forth .......
"The said lessee covenants and agrees to pay a rental at
the rate of ...................................... dollars quarterly in advance,
beginning in ........................ months from this date, until a well
yielding royalty to the lessor is drilled on the leased premises;
..... .upon the drilling of a dry well yielding no roy-
alty to the lessor, the lessee may continue to hold the leased
premises for such further term as the lessee may desire upon
the payment of said rental, not exceeding the term of five
--Venedocla Oil & Gas Co. v. Robinson, 71 0. St. 392, 73 N. E. 222; Woodland
Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 0. St. 161, 44 N. E. 1093; Central Ohio Natural Gas & Fuel
Co. v. Eckert, 70 0. St. 127, 71 N. E. 281; Smith v. South Penn Oil Co., 59 W. Va.
204, 53 S. E. 152; Weaver v. Akin, 48 W. Va. 456, 37 S. E. 600; Snodgrass v. South
Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 509, 35 S. E. 820 Such leases were apparently assumed
to be valid in the following cases: Ohio Oil Co. v. Detamore, 165 Ind. 243, 73 N.
E. 606; Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. St. 173; Richards
Oil Co. v. Morriss, 108 Va. 288, 61 S. E. 762. Where the option of the lessee was
limited to a term of years the lease has been held valid in many cases. If valid
where the term is ten or fifteen years such option lease should be valid where the
term is over twenty-one years or where there Is no time limit. See Guffey o. Smith,
237 U. S. 101; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (C. C. A., 8th Cir.) ;
Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Il. 9, 84 N. E. 53; Pittsburg, etc., Brick
Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90 Pac. 803; Brown %. Fowler, 65 0. St. 507, 63 N. E.
76; Leatherman v. Oliver. 151 Pa. St. 646, 25 AtI. 309.
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years after the expiration of the term above mentioned and as
long thereafter as oil and gas are produced. . .
The above is also a "no-term" lease, the essential element of
such a lease being that the lessee is given the option to extend his
rights indefinitely by payment of the delay rentals from time
to time.
Why is an oil and gas lease, under which an estate vests in the
lessee when he discovers oil or gas, or under which a new estate
vests upon such discovery, objectionable to the rule against per-
petuities where the term is for more than twenty-one years, or
where the term is indefinite but the lease may be kept alive by
the lessee for more than twenty-one years without the discovery
of oil or gas? There are now a number of cases which have fol-
lowed the decision of London & Soutt-Western Railway Co. v.
Gomm,2 3 to the effect that an option to purchase land, or an inter-
est therein, which may be exercised after the expiration of a life
or lives in being and twenty-one years, is void, because it violates
the rule against perpetuities.2" This may perhaps, be taken as the
prevailing law as to options. On the other hand, it is settled that
a covenant for the perpetual renewal of a lease is valid and not
within the rule against perpetuities. This has been said to con-
stitute an exception to the rule against perpetuities.2 5  The "no-
term" oil and gas lease has provisions analogous to a covenant for
the perpetual renewal of a lease, and also to an option to purchase
which may continue unexercised for more than twenty-one years.
The lessee has a right to renew from period to period by merely
paying the delay rental in accordance with the terms of the lease.
The lessee thus has the power to keep said lease alive from term to
term, and the situation is analogous to a case where there is a
covenant for the perpetual renewal of a lease. No plausible argu-
ment can be made that these leases are objectionable because the
lessee may renew from year to year for more than twenty-one
years, except in California where a covenant for the perpetual re-
newal of a lease has been held invalid.2
220 Ch. D. 562.
2' Woodall . Clifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257; Worthing Corporation V. Heather, (1906)
2 Ch. 532; Windsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352; Barton v. Thaw, 246
Pa. St. 348, 92 At. 312; Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56 S. t. 527;
Woodall v. Buren, 76 W. Va. 193. 85 S. E. 170; contra, Hollander v. Central Metal,
etc., Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 AtI. 442.
-GiAY, RULx AGAINST PERPETUITS, 3 ed., §§ 230, 230a, 230aa.
28See Morrison v. Rossignol, 5 Cal. 64.
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If a different estate in the land vests in the lessee under an oil
and gas lease when he discovers oil or gas, or if an estate in the
land for the first time vests in him when oil or gas is discovered,
then, under a "no-term" lease, or under a lease for a fixed term
exceeding twenty-one years, he may not succeed in finding the
mineral until twenty-one years.have elapsed. If he should then
discover oil or gas, there vests in him a new or a different estate
in the land.2' Here we have a situation very similar to the option
cases previously cited.28 The new estate in the land vests in the
lessee because of his act in discovering oil or gas, just as in the
case of the option, the optionee vests the new estate in himself by
exercising the option; hence if an option which the optionee can
exercise after twenty-one years is void, then an oil and gas lease
under which oil or gas might be discovered by the lessee after
twenty-one years, should also be void. This situation is some-
what analogous also to a collateral power of appointment which is
exercisable beyond the limits of the rule against perpetuities.
The rule against perpetuities does not apply to mere contract
rights, but in the case of the oil and gas lease the lessee has more
than a mere contract right. He has a right which may be specific-
ally enforced in equity.29 It is at least an exclusive right to enter
on the land and search for oil and gas, irrevocable during the
continuance of the lease, and, therefore, more than a mere con-
tract right. It is certainly as substantial a property right as that
of the optionee or of the donee of a power of appointment.
The validity of a "no-term" oil and gas lease has apparently
been attacked but once, on the ground that it violates the rule
against perpetuities. This was in the case of 'Wilson v. Reserve
Gas Company.30
The court held that the lease in that ease did not violate the
rule against perpetuities, but the reasons for this conclusion are
not clearly given, nor, with due deference to the learned court, can
they be said to be satisfactory. Whether the objection to the
validity of this lease was urged on the ground of the analogy to
an option for more than twenty-one years, or whether it was on
-' See cases cited in note 15 supra.
28 See cases in note 24, supra. This analogy is suggested in THE BA, Vol. 23, 431
(November, 1916).
" Logan Natural Gas Co. v. Great Southern Gas & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 623; Duffleld
v. Hue, 136 Pa. St. 502, 20 Atl. 526; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va.
438, 76 S. E. 961; Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762.
"088 S. H. 1075.
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the ground that the lessee could by paying the delay rental, renew
the lease perpetually, does not appear from the opinion of the
court, but it is quite probable that only the latter ground was
urged, and that the other ground of objection was not suggested.
In fact, the court expressly compared the case to Thaw v. Gaff-
ney,"' which is a case holding that an option for the perpetual re-
newal of a lease of a building, by the payment of fifty dollars an-
nually in advance, is valid. The court in its opinion said:
"To similar contracts the same objections have been urged,
[that they violate the rule against perpetuities] and, upon
careful examination, heldunfounded. Oil Company v. Snod-
grass, 71 W. Va. 438, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848, and cases cited.
The lessee cannot hold the leased land indefinitely without ex-
ploring the land and producing oil and gas. There is noth-
ing in the contract to deny the lessors the right to terminate
the lease upon reasonable notice. They have not shorn them-
selves of that power. Equity will grant them relief upon
equitable principles. It will cancel for failure or refusal to
develop, upon timely application after due and reasonable
notice. "
Oil Company v. Snodgrass and the cases therein cited do not
show that the application of the rule against perpetuities to the
leases involved was considered. Furthermore, as the lease under
consideration in Oil Company v. Snodgrass was for ten years and
as long thereafter as oil or gas should be produced, it could
not be objectionable to the rule against perpetuities because
the new estate must vest, if at all, within ten years. After dis-
covery of oil or gas the lease would continue as long as either oil
or gas was produced, but this would be only a vested estate for an
indefinite period and, of course, no more objectionable than the
ordinary life estate. Since the lease under consideration in Wilson
v. Reserve Gas Company expressly provided that said lease should
be null and void unless the gas company should elect to pay a quar-
terly sum in advance or should elect to drill a well on said land, it
would seem the lessee had the option to continue the lease indefi-
nitely. If the lessor, under such a lease, has a right to terminate
the lease "for failure to develop upon timely* application after due
and reasonable notice," as was stated by the court, it must be be-
cause the court implies a condition that the lessee must -explore
for oil and gas within a reasonable time after execution of the
- 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983.
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lease, and that pn breach of such condition the lessor may forfeit
the lease after due notice. Where a lessee expressly covenants to
drill a well within three months or to pay a quarterly sum in
advance for each three months' delay in drilling a well until a well
is completed, it would seem that an implied condition that the
lessee must drill a well within a reasonable time, would be incon-
sistent with the express covenants of the lease. So the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently held in Carper v.
United Fuel Co2 Is there a distinction where the lease, as in
Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., provides that it shall be null and
void unless the lessee drills a well within three months or pays
a quarterly sum in advance for each three months' delay in drill-
ing a well? It is difficult to see why there should be any dis-
tinction because of this difference in the stating of the lessee's
option, for if the option is supported by a good consideration it
should be valid only if exercisable within the limit allowed by
the rule against perpetuities. According to the doctrine in the
Carper case, there would be no right in the lessor to terminate the
lease as long as delay rental was paid and no drainage was occur-
ring, and if this were applied to the lease in Wilson v. Reserve
Gas Co., the lease should be held void as violating the rule against
perpetuities.
It is clear, that if the lessor does have a right to terminate an
oil and gas lease within twenty-one years, then the lease does not
violate the rule against perpetuities. But is it not possible that,
admitting there is an implied condition that the lessee explore for
oil and gas, the lessor might not under all circumstances have the
right to forfeit the lease within twenty-one years even though the
lessee does not find oil or gas within that period? Will the court
say as a matter of law that a failure by the lessee to find oil or gas
within twenty-one years is in every case a breach- of the implied
condition? Is it not possible for the lessee to put down dry holes
in his effort to find oil or gas and ultimately succeed in finding the
mineral after twenty-one years have elapsed? If so, there would
still be a possibility that the estate might vest in the lessee beyond
the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities. Hence, if
there should be a condition implied, it would be necessary to hold
such condition must be performed within twenty-one years or the
lease would still be invalid.
89 S. E. 12 (W. Va. 1916).
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1917], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
The courts of one or two jurisdictions now imply a condition
that the lessee must proceed to explore diligently for oil and gas
in spite of express language of the lease giving him a right either to
drill a well or pay delay rentals.33 These courts hold that taking
the lease as a whole it appears that the real consideration for the
same is the exploration and development for oil or gas so that roy-
alties may be produced for the lessor. This is not always true.
Frequently the lessor makes the lease largely for the sake of delay
rentals. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
said :"' "In territory remote from actual and profitable operation,
leases are often taken, without reasonable expectation of any imme-
diate advantage to the lessor other than the rental in the form of
delay money, and with the expectation of delay in drilling until
the neighboring lands are shown to contain minerals, and the sub-
sequent establishment of probability of the existence thereof in
the leased premises." The lessee's business is, at best, an ex- ,
tremely speculative one, and it would seem there can be no good
reason why he should not be allowed to pay delay rental accord-
ing to the agreement, provided there is no drainage from the leased
premises. Such delay rentals are usually substantial sums to pay
for the privilege of holding the lease when we consider the risks of
the lessee. Probably a great majority of the oil and gas leases
prove to be of no value. However, under such a rule of law apply-
ing to oil and gas leases, whether right or wrong, there would be
no violation of the rule against perpetuities, because such leases
would in all cases be terminable by the lessor within a compara-
tively short time.
The courts of most of the states have not yet reached a point
where they are willing to disregard the express language of the
lease and imply such condition to develop the land for oil and gas
under a lease giving the lessee an option to drill a well or pay
delay rentals. In such jurisdictions if it is held that an estate
vests in the lessee when oil or gas is found, it would seem that
"no-term" leases should be held void as violating the rule against
perpetuities.
Perhaps when courts come to consider the question they may
83 Brown v,. Wilson, 160 Pac. 94 (Okla.) ; Hill Oil & Gas Co. v. White, 157 Pac.
710 (Okla.); Monarch Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v. Richardson, 124 Ky. 602, 99 S. W.
668 (semble) ; see also Witherspoon v. Staley. 156 S. W. 557; National Oil & Pipe
Line Co. v. Teel, 67 S. W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App.), affirmed 95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979.
" South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 452, 76 S. E. 961.
11
Simonton: Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1917
OIL AND GAS LEASES AS PEPETUITIES 41
refuse to declare "no-term" leases void as violating the rule
against perpetuities, because such leases have been so long con-
sidered valid that they should not be disturbed at this late date.35
One might argue that there are already so many cases holding
such leases valid without considering the rule against perpetuities
that, like rights of entry for condition broken,8 such leases should
be upheld as another exception to the rule, but as most courts are
not inclined to favor "no-term" oil and gas leases this might be
regarded as a good opportunity finally to dispose of them.
U See cases in note 22 supra.
See cases collected in GnAY, RuLz AGAINST PznSPzTurxm, 3 ed., §f 293, 294.
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